Dr. Sung is a world famous designer of androids. His wife, Sarah, is dying of an incurable disease. In a desperate attempt to save the only woman he ever loved, Dr. Sung designs an android that, to all casual observers, is physically indistinguishable from Sarah. Furthermore, Dr. Sung records the thoughts, memories and beliefs of Sarah and devises a program that reproduces them in the android. After Sarah dies, Dr. Sung activates the android. The android seems to recall her marriage to Dr. Sung, to be deeply in love with him and to have all the same thoughts and memories as Sarah.
Has Sarah survived her death? In other words, is Sarah identical to the android?
There seem to be two different questions at play when determining the answer to this question. The first is whether or not Sarah has survived her death. The answer is no. While there is an exact replica of her standing as a result of the work of her husband, the robot does not have the same continued string of consciousness as her. This problem is reminiscent of the issue of memory of personal identity where a hypnotist hypnotizes person A to have all of the same memories as person B. While the memories are undeniably placed inside person A, no one would claim that the conscious continuity of person B was also transplanted into person A in such a way that whatever "soul" or "actor with agency" that person B has could hypothetically see through both their eyes and person A's eyes. In that same way, just because the memories of Sarah were placed into the android does not mean that the android now possesses her conciousness in a way that would allow sarah to exist within the robot akin to the way we imagine an afterlife where the deceased's conciousness continues. The second question though, is whether a new life or person has been created, to which the answer is yes. The reason why the answer is yes is because Dr. Sung has created a humanlike entity that is capable of utilizing internal states and inputs to produce the correct output in a way that is identical to a human. Just like how synapses don't know anything but the overall system of the brain does, despite the wires not knowing anything, the overall system understands.
ReplyDeleteThe situation raises an important question: what exactly makes someone the same person over time? At first glance, the android appears to be Sarah. It looks identical to her and even seems to remember their marriage and express love for Dr. Sung in the same way the original Sarah did. Because the android possesses Sarah’s memories, beliefs, and personality traits, supporters of the psychological continuity view might argue that Sarah has, in some sense, survived. According to this view, personal identity is grounded in the continuation of mental states such as memories, consciousness, intentions, and character. Since the android appears to preserve all of those psychological features, one might think that Sarah’s identity has been carried forward into the android body. However, there is a strong reason to doubt that Sarah herself has survived. Even if the android perfectly reproduces Sarah’s memories and personality, it is still only a copy. The original Sarah died, and the android was activated afterward. This means that there was no continuous chain of consciousness connecting Sarah’s experience to the android’s experience. Instead, the android begins its existence with a set of programmed memories that merely imitate Sarah’s past mental life. The android might sincerely believe it is Sarah and act exactly as she would, but that does not necessarily make it the same person. In other words, the android seems more like a highly accurate duplicate rather than the continuation of Sarah herself. Personal identity likely requires more than just duplicated psychological traits, it requires the persistence of the same conscious subject over time. Since Sarah’s consciousness ended when she died, the android represents a convincing simulation of Sarah rather than Sarah’s survival. Therefore, while Dr. Sung may have created something that resembles his wife in every outward way, Sarah herself has not truly survived her death.
ReplyDeleteB Dr. Sung is an engineer who designs advanced androids. His life changes when his wife, Sarah, becomes terminally ill. Unable to accept losing her, he attempts something new. Before Sarah dies, Dr. Sung records her memories, beliefs, personality traits, and patterns of thinking. Using this information, he builds an android that looks exactly like her. To anyone who sees it, the android appears physically identical to Sarah. After she passes away, Dr. Sung activates the android. The machine wakes up and behaves as if it were Sarah. It remembers their marriage, recalls events from her life, and expresses love for Dr. Sung just as the real Sarah once did. This situation raises an important philosophical question about personal identity. At first, it might seem reasonable to think Sarah has somehow continued to exist. The android not only looks like her but also remembers the same experiences and shows the same emotions. According to the psychological view of identity, a person remains the same over time because their mental life continues. If memories, beliefs, and personality traits remain the same, the person may still exist even if the body changes. Since the android has all of Sarah’s psychological traits, some might argue that Sarah survives through the android. However, there are strong reasons to doubt this. The android was created only after Sarah died. Her life ended, and the android began as a new being. There is no continuous stream of consciousness linking Sarah’s experiences to the android’s awareness. Instead, the android starts with copied memories. Because of this, it seems better to view the android as a replica of Sarah rather than Sarah herself.
ReplyDeleteThis situation can be viewed from many different perspectives, such as the mind view, biological view, and soul view. When analyzing the question of whether she has died, each view says something different. If you are a strong believer of the biological view, which says that the biological continuity of a person is what makes them who they are, then Sarah has died. The android's appearance is indistinguishable from the real sarah from the outside, but when you look on the inside of the droid there is no biological similarities to the original sarah. The mind view which says that the phsycological continuity of a person is what determines who they are. Analyzing this situation from the perspective of the mind view, Sarah has not died because the android has her memories from the past and can think like Sarah would. Finally, when viewing this situation from the soul view, it is very likely that Sarah has died. The soul view says that the unique soul that each person has defines them as a human, but the android most likely does not have a soul or the same soul that the original Sarah possessed. Whether Sarah has died or is alive is up for interpretation based on how you view the situation. But in my opinion, Sarah has died, and the android is just a projection of her past memories and future thoughts and actions. This specific situation challenges all three philosophical viewpoints of how to define a human being, but after applying each one to this situation, Sarah is more dead than she is alive.
ReplyDeleteDr. Sung, a world-famous android designer, may have made an android to replace his wife after she developed an incurable disease, but it is not the same person as his wife who passed away. Even if the android is indistinguishable from the original Sarah, it is still not her. Sarah herself would not be able to make new memories. While the android may have more storage and can keep memories in its hard drive, that is not the same as Sarah actually making those memories herself. According to functionalism, the android does not make memories in the same way that a human would, or the way Sarah would. If there is a difference in the output compared to the original, then it is not the same person. Similarly, the android would not age the way a human would. Because of this, it cannot be Sarah, since Sarah is human. If Sarah had lived longer, she would have aged naturally, but the android cannot do that, which further shows that it is not really her. Another way to look at this situation is through the memory view, which relies heavily on memory continuity. In Dr. Sung’s case, he recorded all of Sarah’s beliefs, memories, and thoughts before she passed away, allowing him to transfer them into the android afterward. However, the gap between Sarah’s death and the android’s awakening creates a break in the psychological continuity between them. You could argue that the android’s “memories” are artificial or copied memories, which would mean the android is not truly Sarah.
ReplyDeleteAlthough the android may look and act identical to Sarah, Sarah is dead. Because Sarah’s physical body, soul, and individual identity cannot be replicated down to the DNA she is not the same person. Simply replicating looks and memories is not enough to say the android is the same person as Sarah. Additionally, the android does not have the same chemical structure and brain function as a human brain because the human brain has not been replicated in this scenario, nor could a human brain ever truly be replicated. Therefore, despite the physical similarities and copy of memories the android should be considered a separate entity because human beings are not replicable. Lastly, the android cannot be the same person as Sarah because there is no continuity of consciousness. When Sarah died, her stream of consciousness ended. Even if the android has her memories, it does not share her consciousness therefore Sarah is dead.
ReplyDeleteIn this case, it might seem as if Sarah survived because the android looks like her and has all of her thoughts and memories. The android remembers being married to Dr. Sung and feels the same love Sarah did for him. From the outside, it would be hard to tell the real sarah and the android. Due to this, some people could argue that sarah survived in the android.
ReplyDeleteHowever, sarah has not actually survived. Even though the android has Sarah's memories and personality, it's still a different being. The real sarah was a living human, and the android is just a machine programmed to act like her. The android remembers Sarah's life, but did not actually live through those experiences.
This connects to ideas about personal identity and especially the debate of whether memories alone can make someone the same person over time. If memories were the only thing that mattered, then the android could be considered the same person as Sarah. In that case, you could copy someone's memories into multiple androids and it would not work out.
Overall, the android is copying a replacement of sarah, rather than the real sarah herself. It can continue her memories and personality, but the real sarah died when her body and life ended.
Dr. Sung’s android may appear exactly like Sarah and even think like her, but that does not necessarily mean that Sarah has survived. According to functionalism, what matters for identity is whether the same mental functions are replicated. In this case, the android behaves exactly like Sarah because it has been programmed with all of her memories and personality. But this alone is not enough to prove that Sarah is the same person as the android. The situation does not satisfy both the body view and the mind view of personal identity at the same time. The body view argues that a person remains the same as long as they have the same physical body. In this scenario, Sarah’s biological body has died, and the android is an entirely new physical “body”. Because the body is different, the body view would say that Sarah did not survive. Even if someone accepts only the mind view, the situation is still iffy. The android only copies Sarah’s memories and thoughts, but does not continue Sarah’s consciousness. An example is the famous Prince and the Cobbler scenario. In that thought experiment, the prince’s memories and consciousness are placed into the cobbler’s body. While the cobbler’s body might act like the prince, people would still see the cobbler physically and may not identify him as the prince. The cobbler would engulf the identity of the prince, essentially forming a new person altogether and killing both the original prince and the original cobbler. In this case, the android only imitates Sarah’s mind but does not actually continue her existence. Because Sarah’s original body has died and the android only replicates her mental life, the android should be considered a new person rather than Sarah herself. Functional similarity alone is not enough to preserve personal identity.
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ReplyDeleteDr. Sung’s wife, Sarah, has been replaced by an android that looks no different from when she was alive, yet it is questionable whether this is Sarah or something else entirely. The Sarah case doesn’t just challenge whether the android is Sarah, but also reveals that personal identity isn’t coherent of a concept enough to answer this question in the first place.
ReplyDeleteThere is a strong case for Sarah surviving, but it creates problems that can’t be ignored. Everything that makes her what she was is preserved in the android that still lives on, so what is the problem? Following arguments made by Parfit, survival isn’t based upon strict numerical identity, but instead on psychological continuity, or the preservation of memories, personality, and relationships over time. By this standard, Sarah passes all these tests. However, this conclusion leaves many holes. This argument feels unfinished because the cloning problem stops this argument. If another android were to be created with the same process, the other android would also be Sarah, which clearly isn’t the same. By this logic, identity can be copied, duplicated, and mass-produced. This isn’t what personal identity is. It is multiplication.
The case for Sarah’s death is also equally serious. The android is something new, meaning that the gap in her consciousness was enough to consider her dead. This argument follows the argument taken in the transporter argument, where if a book burns, just because a copy of the book was printed the next day, it doesn’t mean that the book has been exactly saved. The no answer hits its biggest wall when asked to point to what is actually missing from Android Sarah. She is functionally the same. The way she feels, acts, loves, thinks, everything. Anyone who knew her wouldn’t be able to tell the difference. Whatever isn’t there with this android is invisible, so this argument can’t point to anything concrete that’s actually missing.
Both answers feel wrong here. One case leaves us with a copiable identity that makes identity lose its meaning, and another leaves us with an unplaceable difference between people that doesn’t have a functional difference. Personal identity is a concept that works fine for most everyday life, but falls apart in these more rigorous cases. This is why Parfit argued that identity mattered less than we assume. The real importance comes from the continuity of relationship and experiences, not the strict sameness of self.
The grief from Dr. Sung and the love from the android are both real. Whether the android is Sarah or not isn’t the right question to ask. This case doesn’t need an answer, and can be a test where personal identity fails. We rely on the concept constantly without actually asking if the base is actually strong enough to support the structure.
In the case of Dr. Sung’s android, Sarah’s body has died, but that does not mean Sarah's identity has died. This is because identity is held within the mind, and can exist separate from the body. Additionally, the mind is just an accumulation of mental states, so if the android can perfectly replicate those functional states, Sarah’s mind still exists. Sarah does continue to live because her mind continues to live when the android functionally replicates Sarah’s mental states.
ReplyDeleteThe mind view is the philosophical theory that states personal identity lies within a continuous mind rather than the body or a soul. The mind view is the most compelling argument for personal identity, because the other arguments are flawed or objective. The soul view cannot be true because the immaterial nature of a soul makes proving its existence or tracking it impossible. If the soul view were true, it would be impossible to track identity over time and tell when someone does or does not cease to exist. Furthermore, the body cannot be used to determine personal identity, because the body is always changing. Cells in the body die and regrow constantly throughout a person’s lifetime, amputees have limbs removed, and people cut their hair and nails. In all of these situations, personal identity remains unaltered, despite the body being changed. Personal identity cannot rely on a soul or the body, therefore continuity of Sarah’s mind is what will determine if she survives.
Sarah’s mind does in fact survive because the android is functionally equivalent to Sarah. According to functionalism, the mind at its simplest level is just mental states, and mental states are defined by the processing of inputs into outputs. The android perfectly recreates Sarah’s mental processing meaning for every input it would give the same output she would. Since personal identity is decided by mental states, Sarah’s mind, and therefore Sarah survives in the new body of the android.